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In the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, public health experts have produced guidelines to limit the spread of the coronavirus, but individuals do not always comply with experts’ recommendations. Here, we tested whether a specific psychological belief—identification with all humanity—predicts cooperation with public health guidelines as well as helpful behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. We hypothesized that peoples’ endorsement of this belief—their relative perception of a connection and moral commitment to other humans—would predict their tendencies to adopt World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines and to help others. To assess this, we conducted a global online study ( N = 2537 participants) of four WHO-recommended health behaviors and four pandemic-related moral dilemmas that we constructed to be relevant to helping others at a potential cost to oneself. We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) that included 10 predictor variables (demographic, contextual, and psychological) for each of five outcome measures (a WHO cooperative health behavior score, plus responses to each of our four moral, helping dilemmas). Identification with all humanity was the most consistent and consequential predictor of individuals’ cooperative health behavior and helpful responding. Analyses showed that the identification with all humanity significantly predicted each of the five outcomes while controlling for the other variables ( P range < 10 −22 to < 0.009). The mean effect size of the identification with all humanity predictor on these outcomes was more than twice as large as the effect sizes of other predictors. Identification with all humanity is a psychological construct that, through targeted interventions, may help scientists and policymakers to better understand and promote cooperative health behavior and help-oriented concern for others during the current pandemic as well as in future humanitarian crises. 

We (Meltzoff et al., 2018) described how Oostenbroek et al.’s (2016) design likely dampened infant imitation. In their commentary, Oostenbroek et al. (2018) argue that our points are post hoc. It is important for readers to know that they are not. Our paper restated “best practices” described in published papers. Based on the literature, the design used by Oostenbroek et al. (2016) would be predicted to dampen infant imitation. First, Oostenbroek et al.’s (2016) test periods were too brief. The stimulus presentation for each type of gesture was too short to ensure that neonates saw the display. The response measurement period did not allow neonates sufficient time to organize a motor response. Meltzoff and Moore (1983a, 1994) introduced experimental procedures specifically designed to address these issues (also, Simpson, Murray, Paukner, & Ferrari, 2014). Oostenbroek et al. did not capitalize on these procedural advances. Second, Oostenbroek et al. allowed uncontrolled experimenter–infant interactions during the test session itself. Previous papers on imitation provided analyses of how uncontrolled interactions with the experimenter can introduce “noise” in experiments of facial imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983b, 1994). Third, Oostenbroek et al. used suboptimal eliciting conditions. Neonates cannot support their own heads; in Oostenbroek et al., infants’ heads were allowed to flop from side-to-side unsupported on the experimenter’s lap while the experimenter gestured with both hands. In addition, papers have listed techniques for maximizing visual attention (controlled lighting, homogeneous background) (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989, 1994). Oostenbroek et al. tested infants on a couch in the home. Despite a design that would blunt imitation, our reanalysis of Oostenbroek et al.’s data showed a response pattern that is consistent with the imitation of tongue protrusion (TP). In their commentary, Oostenbroek et al. (2018) now propose limiting analyses to a subset of their original controls. We reanalyzed their data accordingly. Again, the results support early imitation. Their cross-sectional data (Oostenbroek et al., 2016, Table S4) collapsed across age show significantly more infant TP in response to the TP demonstration than to the mean of the six dynamic face controls (mouth, happy, sad, mmm, ee, and click): t(104) = 4.62, p = 0.00001. The results are also significant using a narrower subset of stimuli (mouth, happy, and sad): t(104) = 3.20, p = 0.0018. These results rule out arousal, because the adult TP demonstration was significantly more effective in eliciting infant tongue protrusions than the category of dynamic face controls. Tongue protrusion matching is a robust phenomenon successfully elicited in more than two dozen studies (reviews: Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Nagy, Pilling, Orvos, & Molnar, 2013; Simpson et al., 2014). There are more general lessons to be drawn. Psychology is experiencing what some call a “replication crisis.” Those who attempt to reproduce effects have scientific responsibilities, as do original authors. Both can help psychology become a more cumulative science. It is crucial for investigators to label whether or not a study is a direct replication attempt. If it is not a direct replication, procedural alterations and associated limitations should be discussed. It sows confusion to use procedures that are already predicted to dampen effects, without alerting readers. Psychology will be advanced by more stringent standards for reporting and evaluating studies aimed at reproducing published effects. Infant imitation is a fundamental skill prior to language and contributes to the development of social cognition. On this both Oostenbroek et al. and we agree. 

The meaning, mechanism, and function of imitation in early infancy have been actively discussed since Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977) report of facial and manual imitation by human neonates. Oostenbroek et al. (2016) claim to challenge the existence of early imitation and to counter all interpretations so far offered. Such claims, if true, would have implications for theories of social- cognitive development. Here we identify 11 flaws in Oostenbroek et al.’s experimental design that biased the results toward null effects. We requested and obtained the authors’ raw data. Contrary to the authors’ conclusions, new analyses reveal significant tongue- protrusion imitation at all four ages tested (1, 3, 6, and 9 weeks old). We explain how the authors missed this pattern and offer five recommendations for designing future experiments. Infant imitation raises fundamental issues about action representation, social learning, and brain–be-havior relations. The debate about the origins and development of imitation reflects its importance to theories of developmental science. 

Altruistic behavior entails giving valuable benefits to others while incurring a personal cost. A distinctively human form of altruistic behavior involves handing nutritious food to needy strangers, even when one desires the food. Engaging in altruistic food transfer, instead of keeping the food, is costly, because it reduces the caloric intake of the benefactor vis-à-vis the beneficiary. Human adults engage in this form of altruistic behavior during times of war and famine, when giving food to others threatens one’s own survival. Our closest living primate relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), exhibit notable constraints on the proclivity to engage in such food transfer (particularly chimpanzees), although they share many social-cognitive commonalities with humans. Here we show that in a nonverbal test, 19-month-old human infants repeatedly and spontaneously transferred high-value, nutritious natural food to a stranger (Experiment 1) and more critically, did so after an experimental manipulation that imposed a feeding delay (Experiment 2), which increased their own motivation to eat the food. Social experience variables moderated the expression of this infant altruistic behavior, suggesting malleability.